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Abstract
Radio Sawa in Jordan: Different Perceptions, Together?
This study attempted to take the issue of Radio Sawa – a United States Congressfunded public
relations endeavor that has enjoyed significant recent popularity in much of the Middle East – and
expound upon issues of its perceived motivations, intentions, attractiveness, credibility, and
effectiveness in relation to the Jordanian public, primarily the younger generation that constitutes the
station's target audience. Local professionals involved in media and academia were asked to comment
upon such questions as well as to provide insight into the broader state of radio media reception in
Jordan. Research obtained for the study found general agreement that the Radio Sawa endeavor suffers
severe limitations on its ability to directly affect Jordanian public opinion, for widespread antagonism
toward the United States was cited in nearly every case as a response to broader American foreign
policy, a factor that outweighs any positive effects that targeted media efforts otherwise may have.
Music and entertainment programming was confirmed as hypothesized to be the foremost source of the
station's attractiveness and consequent popularity, but the value and credibility of its news and
information broadcasts remained a matter of debate among the subjects. These disagreeing perspectives
were contextualized in theories of persuasive communication and source credibility in a motion to
explain them as consequences of different preconceptions in regard to Radio Sawa's messages and
intentions, a phenomenon that is certain to affect the larger audience's perception of the station as well.
The study also pinpointed the necessity of continued research in Jordan's radio industry, the nature of
which has been transformed dramatically in recent years by widespread privatization, mirroring the
historic shift away from staterun media occurring throughout other parts of the Arab world as well.
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“Music is an international language.”  Mahmoud Zawawi, Radio Sawa
“Radio should be a friend.”  Haitham Shibli, Jordan Radio
“Media has to be indigenous.”  Daoud Kuttab, AmmanNet
“[Our] mission is to promote freedom and democracy – the President's
policy in the region – by broadcasting accurate, reliable, and objective
news and information.”  August 2005 Middle East Broadcasting
Networks Performance Report
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Introductions

I'm sure that I heard Radio Sawa long before I ever heard about Radio Sawa. It's nearly
impossible spend more than a few days in Amman, taking cabs from place to place, and not be exposed
to it as one your drivers maneuvers his way through the city's backedup traffic. On occasion the more
hospitable of drivers, intent on making his young American client feel at home, actively switches the
radio receiver to it: 98.1, the station where you're bound to find songs that are at least youthful if not
straight off the American billboard's top20. The music is hip and varied, traversing the the boundaries
between Western and Arabic pop music nearseamlessly. Where else, in any case, can you find pop
stars Britney Spears and Amr Diab playing back to back?1
My first real knowledge of Radio Sawa, however, came to me one day as I was haphazardly
flipping through the pages of the touristgeared Rough Guide to Jordan. One of a small handful of radio
stations profiled in the guidebook's “Media” section, the station is briefly summarized in two sentences
as “publicly funded by the US Congress,” “hugely popular for its innovative music policy,” and “set up
so that the US government could broadcast its news and opinions in Arabic directly to the people of the
Middle East.”2 I was immediately intrigued. In which sort of manner, I was already beginning to
wonder, do these elements correspond with each other, and how representative is this case of the way
that Jordanian society parses and responds to broadcast media in general? The Rough Guide finalizes
its description of Radio Sawa by asserting “it seems ... that most listeners love the music and ignore the
propaganda in between.” But is it truly all that simple? To what extent do Jordanian listeners really
consider Sawa's nonmusic programming propaganda? Is the station even all that widely recognized as
a United States initiative – and if so, how do people know? How much, in this specific social context,
can the realms of news and opinion be granted elevated credibility by the merit of popular music? As
my interest peaked and I began to read more on the subject, my questions both expanded in scope and
became more specific individually, and from there I chose to embark upon this particular research
project. I knew that there were more than two sentences to this story, in Jordan alone.
1
2

George Gedda, “Radio Sawa: Music As a Tool,” Foreign Service Journal, November 2002, p. 53.
Matther Teller, The Rough Guide to Jordan, Third Edition (New York: Rough Guides Inc., 2006), p. 72.
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Having established personal interest in Radio Sawa as a topic worthy of academic exploration, I
next set out to situate the research I was considering into my studies as a student of international
relations in the Middle East. What sort of larger forces does this endeavor represent, and what is the
nature of the role that these forces play in the overall scheme of Jordan's process of modernization?
Radio, on one hand, is part of the quintessentially modern phenomenon of easilyaccessed media
consumed on a mass scale, and Sawa owes its existence and effectiveness to the way in which Jordan
has integrated this innovation. This particular scenario, while focusing on a single iteration of radio
media, provides an obvious parallel to the everchanging face of mass communication that
accompanies the country's implementation of technological progress. The Radio Sawa effort
additionally points to the continuing efforts of foreign powers – in this case the United States – to
affect, direct, and contribute to Jordan's popular national discourse. As a “semirentier state” that is
heavily dependent on economic aid and other external monetary resources, often granted in unspoken
exchange for its political support, this foreign interest appears unlikely to wane in the foreseeable
future.3 The more fluid mannerisms and related effectiveness of these this extranational influences, that
said, lie among some of the central forces bearing the potential to define the trajectory of Jordan's
cultural and political existence.
Radio Sawa is an exemplary manifestation of such intentions on the part of the United States,
and the form of the reception that it receives in Jordan as well as throughout the rest of the Arab world
is a crucial hint to the as to the nature of the social forces of communication and persuasion as they
play out both in this individual state and in the broader region surrounding it. The identity of the United
States as a key player in Middle Eastern politics has remained strong in recent years, but at the same
time its popularity as such has continued to decline following continuing military and political
engagements in the region that are largely resented by most Arabs.4 Particularly in the face of such an
upsurge in dissatisfaction with its policies, the United State's ability to influence public opinion by
additional means remains an important strategic concern, especially in cases where it is unwilling to
3
4
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change the unpopular practices themselves. This study will to some degree gage the viability of
affecting public opinion toward the United States by means of the broadcast endeavor Radio Sawa, the
implications of which will comment on the degree of pliability of this opinion itself and the
effectiveness of media in changing it in regard to policies which otherwise remain static. In doing so
the study will likewise provide Jordanians both consciousness of the factors that play a role in
dissemination of agenda and opinion from external sources and awareness of the relationship between
different spheres of media and their effects upon each other when broadcast simultaneously from the
same source.
My hypothesis as I approached this study project on Radio Sawa was that despite the
oversimplicity of the Rough Guide's “listeners love the music and ignore the propaganda”
summarization of the station, its general conceptualization of Jordanian perception of Radio Sawa was
on target. Preliminary statistics showed that the station has indeed been popular in the country over the
course of the first few years since its inception, but listening statistics say little about why an audience
listens.5 With a 24hour broadcast that is composed largely of popular music, however, my assumption
was that this entertainment programming held significantly more appeal than the station's more
sparselyscheduled newscasts.6 I had serious doubts as to whether the nonentertainment portions of
Radio Sawa held much credibility in the eyes of the station's target audience and even more as to if
anyone would ever tune in to the station for these segments primarily. American government outlets
have not proved the most viable sources for news and opinion in Jordan. Studies of the United States'
alHurra Television – a project umbrellaed under the same organization that funds Radio Sawa, the
Middle East Broadcasting Networks – have shown that the channel is generally ineffective in garnering
an audience, even without comments upon what percentage of this already small audience is truly
responsive to its messages.7 If Jordanians aren't searching out the American perspective on a television
channel that airs primarily news, why would they pursue it on a radio station mostly characterized by
5

6
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Press Release, “Alhurra Television and Radio Sawa Audience Jumps to 35 Million in the Middle East,” Middle East
Broadcasting Network, 23 August 2005.
Deirdre Kline, “Fact Sheet: Radio Sawa,” attachment to personal email, 5 January 2007.
Lindsay Wise, “A Second Look at Alhurra: USFunded Channel Comes of Age on the Front Lines of the 'Battle for
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its music?
Radio Sawa, of course, is certainly a different case and cannot be fully paralleled to alHurra:
most importantly, it has succeeded in its goal of establishing a listening base. The two networks may be
ideologically related and even employ some of the same basic marketing tactics – alHurra isn't
exclusively newscasts either, with “travel and fashion shows, medical and technology series, cinema
and music programs” among its mostwatched offerings – but the American television network has
never been a real competitor on Jordan's satellitetelevision front line.8 This reality is radically different
from the Radio Sawa narrative, which witnessed the station's unparalleled ascension to the numberone
spot among Jordanian radio within roughly three months following its launch.9 Part of this study's
intrigue for me has been the logistics of the aforementioned scenario, and likewise another of its
intentions is to root out an idea as to how such may have become the case. I had some initial
possibilities in mind. FM radio is a local undertaking, for example, and maybe this limitation of
geographic scope cut out a lot of Sawa's potential competition. Traditional government limitations on
private radio might have contributed to the same effect from a different angle. In either case, Radio
Sawa has still managed to create a media entity that resonates well with Jordanians, and even the most
opportune logistical circumstances won't singlehandedly make people listen in. Through this project, I
hope to explore the source of the station's overall attractiveness in the Jordanian radio market as well.
I decided that my study of Radio Sawa would be best contextualized in theories of media
perception and credibility discussed alongside public opinion research on Arab views of the United
States, the latter being a key motivation for the Radio Sawa project in the first place. By identifying
contemporary trends in the Arab world's attitude – including Jordanians' specifically – toward the
United States both politically and culturally, it is possible to identity some of the public opinion
challenges that American media efforts are seeking to address as well as viable avenues by which they
may attempt to do so. This “base perception” of an information source, independent of whatever effects
on opinion Radio Sawa may be able to produce, has been demonstrated in similar studies of audience

8
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opinion to affect the nature of the listener's response to the media.10 In the particular case of Radio
Sawa, such a theory could suggest that listeners already unfavorable toward certain aspects of United
States policy would be comparatively even more skeptical toward broadcasts that they identified as
ideologically in line with these practices. In this light, I expected to see perceptions of Radio Sawa that
varied from each other depending on the source from which they came, and my choice of subtitling this
project “Different Perceptions, Together?” reflects the study's intention of addressing this question of
discrepancy.
I also realized that connecting Radio Sawa to the historical precedent of United States overseas
broadcasting was a necessity to exploration of both the logistical process of its establishment and the
ideological precepts that guide its continuing operation. In order to provide such a context I briefly
researched the background and motivations involved in Radio Sawa's predecessor in the Middle East,
the Voice of America. While this program was of a very different nature and never achieved popularity
comparable to its offspring endeavor, some of its underlying goals and purposes were markedly
similar. Radio Sawa is a relatively new concept in realization, but it is indeed grounded in much of the
legal precedent, philosophy, and infrastructure of the Voice of America and its history in the Middle
East.11 This study attempts to frame the Jordanian relationship with Radio Sawa not as a product of the
isolated historical period consisting of the few years since the station's official launch, but as a
culmination of both Jordanian society's larger interplay with broadcast media and the much longer
lived legacy of targeted public relations efforts from the United States. These are the social forces that
have contributed to the contemporary environment of Jordanian Radio in which Sawa exists and is now
helping to define on its own terms.
“Sawa” is an Arabic word that means “together,” and as a name for such a massive
communications project it certainly implies that its goal is to bring something to that state. But what is
that something? Americans and Arabs? Their respective popular music? Entertainment and news?
Radio Sawa has been on the air for five years and counting. Maybe now can we take some of the many
10
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pieces of its puzzle and begin to arrange them, together.

Rationale

An effective study of Radio Sawa in Jordan mandates first that a background for the station and
the environment for its reception in the country be provided. As such the sections to follow will briefly
discuss the precedent of the Voice of America, current literature on Radio Sawa, the Arab public's
attitude toward the United States, and applicable theories of effective communication. Related issues
requiring exploration will be synopsized into the format in which they were approached as research
questions. Each of these contexts has served as an integral basis for the study in its own right, and will
be referenced among the discussion and findings.

The Voice of America as Radio Sawa's Predecessor

Following its entrance into World War II and United States' newly assumed role as a global
power, its ability to communicate its perspectives with the populations of other nations came into play
as a crucial component of foreign policy. This emerging concern was soon institutionalized and
addressed under the auspices of the newly formed communications network entitled the “Voice of
America” (often abbreviated “VOA).12 Legally, the government of the United States, by demands of
the First Amendment, has no authority to direct the content of incountry broadcasts to the American
people. Outside of the United States, however, this limitation does not prevail; the Voice of America
was established as an arm of the United States government on this principle and continues to operate
on it.13 The Voice of America began its history in February of 1942, when it first went on air in the
German language, directed at the German people. As the VOA program expanded to meet new foreign
policy directives and successfully secured continued governmental funding, new language branches
12
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were added in order to reach new population groups, and individual channels were adjusted to suit the
government's priority for each one's target locality. The most extensive Voice of America language
networks have traditionally been Russian and Chinese, but following the end of the Cold War the
Russian network has lost much of its historical priority. The Arabiclanguage VOA program was first
initiated in January 1950, and operated from that point until the year 2002, when Radio Sawa was
established in its place.14
Given that many of regions to which the Voice of America has been intended for broadcast
have been and sometimes still are under the control of regimes inhospitable to such an American
endeavor, contemporary technological innovations have been consistently employed to bypass
broadcast restrictions and likewise increase the networks' overall efficiency.15 Originally, the majority
of VOA programs were both produced in and transmitted from the United States itself using short
wave radio technology. The benefit of such a strategy lies first in that shortwave radio – given
adequate power – has the capability of reaching nearly anywhere in the world, and the subsequent
advantage is that it requires no negotiation on the part of the US government with other states to
acquire either transmission stations or frequencies. The downside of shortwave broadcasts, on the
other hand, is that they suffer in quality almost inherently and reliability with any change in climate,
landscape or weather patterns.16 As its VOArelated initiatives continued to grow and moved to address
these inefficiencies, the American government adopted a new strategy of negotiating rights to “relay
stations” in foreign nations that would be able to receive and retransmit the shortwave broadcast from
the United States in the form of a morelocalized, betterquality mediumwave (AM) technology. This
approach improved both the capacity and reliability of the organization's broadcasts.
The commercial advent of the transistor radio in 1954 was an especially significant
development for the United States' foreign communications endeavors. Prior to this point, most radio
access in the Middle East had defaulted to coffeehouses and other gathering places where the
proprietor of the business dictated the radio dial, as Charles Glock had lamented in a discussion of
14
15
16

Ibid.
Kohler, p. 21.
Ibid.

14

media and opinion formation just a year earlier.17 As previously bulky and expensive radios were
miniaturized and experienced a dramatic fall in price, their distribution moved out of the realm of these
public spaces and into the sphere of individual ownership. In effect, this innovation increased the size –
as well as changed the social composure – of the world radiolistening audience by yetunseen
dimensions.18 The new accessibility of radio transmissions to the general public made continued
localization of Voice of America programs more effective, and in turn a new focus arose not only on
expanding mediumwave transmissions but eventually on also implementing the betterquality, though
more limitedranged, longwave radio known as FM. This shift, of course, reiterated to the United
States the necessity of establishing localityspecific transmitters, and in more recent years numerous
deals have been made with foreign governments to secure sites and frequencies for transmitting US
funded programs to their respective surrounding territories on FM radio.19
Radio Sawa came into existence just in time to capitalize on this trend as it began to play out on
a larger scale in the Middle East. In 2002 the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) – the body
responsible for regulating and funding American overseas media networks – made the decision to
commission a new radio project in the Arab world in place of the preexisting Voice of America Arabic
service.20 Initiated under the direction of the BBG's subsidiary Middle East Broadcasting Networks
(MBN), the principle idea behind this replacement network would be to “broadcast FM [radio
programs] to as many countries as possible.”21 Again due to the range limitations of FM technology,
this initiative would necessitate the establishment of transmitters in each Arab state. Following the
19901991 Gulf War and expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait the United States had already established a
Voice of America transmitter in the small gulf state that could be utilized for such a purpose, but a
station broadcast from this locality could constitute only a small segment of Radio Sawa's intended
scope. Negotiations followed quickly, and FM agreements began to emerge in other USallied states in
the region shortly afterward. After a year and a half of negotiations, Jordan became the “first [new]
17

18
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country to sign an FM agreement” with the United States, and Radio Sawa began to broadcast from
Amman.22

Regarding Radio Sawa Specifically

The new station became a success in Jordan in terms of popularity almost immediately
following its implementation. “Targeted at young people,” primarily youth of 18 to 28 years – a group
that composes a relatively large percentage of Jordanians in a region where over 60% of the population
is under 30 – the station was wellreceived and soon came to dominate the local radio market.23 By
2003, “Radio Sawa was the number one station in Jordan.”24 To locate the sort of model that would
help meet these audience goals, the American Government had earlier contacted a firm called Edison
Media Research. “The goal, first and foremost,” writes employee Tom Webster, “was always to put on
a station that people would find hard not to listen to. A station that would be like nothing else that was
available but would sound like something they always wanted.”25 The formula for garnering a mass
audience worked. At the same time, Sawa's strategy of attracting it by appealing to popular demand for
music was a dramatic departure from the traditional Voice of America style, and has received criticism
for the implications this may have had in keeping its smaller but potentially more elite audience.26 The
notion of an inherent tradeoff of this nature has backing in academic discourse. “In their tendency to
address as wide a public as possible,” writes Ivo Josiposi in the June 1984 International Review of the
Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, “the mass media have to adapt to the tastes and standards of the
masses who are their potential consumers. So, they adapt their programmes and activities to the level of
the average consumer.”27
22

23
24
25

26
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Radio Sawa nonetheless stresses that it is not simply an entertainment outlet, and emphasizes its
news and information programming as central components of its broadcast agenda. A “Frequently
Asked Questions” document provided by MBN Communications Director Deirdre Kline states that
“although Radio Sawa’s format features an upbeat mix of Western and Arabic popular music to help
attract as wide an audience as possible, news is a significant part of Radio Sawa’s programming.”28 The
station moreover cites programming of this nature as balanced and objective. “Radio Sawa,” declares a
2005 MBN press release on the station's popularity, “is committed to broadcasting accurate, timely and
relevant news about the Middle East, the world and the United States, to the highest standards of
journalism, as well as the free marketplace of ideas, respect for the intelligence and culture of its
audience, and a style that is upbeat, modern and forwardlooking.”29 According to informational
literature provided by the MBN, the presence of the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an
independent federal agency “serves as oversight and a firewall to protect the professional independence
and integrity of the broadcasters.”30
The truth to Radio Sawa's selfproclaimed identity as a credible newscaster and commentator,
however, is a matter of much debate outside the circle of its own employees and informational
literature. In a 2004 testimony before the United States Senate, William A. Rugh specifically critiqued
the effectiveness of this claim to autonomy with a comment that “the 'firewall' that the Broadcasting
Board of Governors speaks of, separating Radio Sawa from State Department policy, was not seen or
appreciated by Arab listeners.”31 A 2006 academic study by Mohammed elNawawy of Queens
University resulted in conclusions strongly in agreement with this notion. By surveying a sample of
394 students from five different Arab countries, the study attempted to locate the extent of Radio
Sawa's (as well as Alhurra's) news credibility and compare it to the respondents' perceptions of United
States policy.32 99 of the students surveyed were from Jordan, and their responses generally reflected
28
29

30
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those of other participants in the study. Following his research, elNawawy concluded that Radio Sawa
suffered “relatively low newscredibility” and that “because many Arab media users today are
intensely aware of the US administration's motives in trying to win Arab hearts and minds and improve
its image in the Arab world, they have a tendency not to trust news broadcast on Radio Sawa.”33 In
related discussion, the lack of correlation between listening frequency and increased credibility –
elements that have appeared related in studies of other media outlets – is explained by noting that for
most respondents the primary attraction of Radio Sawa was identified as its music programming.34 This
comment refers back to the station's apparent success in attracting a youthful audience by such means.
A 2005 paper published in the Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal by Wendy Sefsaf
approached the question of Radio Sawa's and Alhurra's respective credibility and potential for effective
communication from a more literaturebased angle of public communication. While an article that
hypothesizes many of the same conclusions elNawawy would confirm methodologically a year later, a
criticism of this paper lies in that it often fails to make make notable distinctions between Radio Sawa
and Alhurra, instead opting to group analysis into an overarching indictment of both of the networks
simultaneously. “The BBG's ... messages are not only failing to influence their audience,” the author
writes, “but are actually proving offensive to them. They also display a lack of cultural awareness and
appropriateness which is widening, rather than bridging, the gap between Arabs and Americans.”35
While such a conclusion may well be true for Alhurra, a 2005 ACNielson survey's findings that forty
percent of young Jordanians – actually one of the lower percentages for a Radio Sawa target state with
incountry FM broadcast of the station – were regular listeners to the radio network's programming
suggests that there is not a complete cultural disconnect between it and its audience.36 The Sefsaf article
also makes the debatable assertion that “any listener to a USsponsored station is likely to be favorably
disposed to the United States,” whereas when this proposed correlation was quantified in elNawawy's
33
34
35
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2006 study he found “no significant relationship between the frequency of listening to Radio Sawa and
favorability toward US foreign policy.”37 In conclusion the Sefsaf paper asserts, again treating Radio
Sawa and Television Alhurra as identical media entities, that “[all the United States has] created in
terms of a solution to [its] public relations crisis is a poorly funded and thoughtout plan of public
diplomacy,” suggesting by implication that American media efforts do have the power to transform
opinion if only implemented in a different form.38

Contemporary Arab Public Opinion of the United States

The issue of public opinion and its formation, given the ideological aims behind Radio Sawa,
must be developed in order to conceptualize the potential that the media endeavor either does or does
not have to affect it. Public opinion has been defined by Virginia R. Sedman of Columbia University in
a stillwidely applicable 1932 paper as “an active or latent force derived from a composite of individual
thoughts, sentiments and impressions, which composite is weighted by the varying degrees of influence
and aggressiveness of the separate opinions within the aggregate.”39 Sedman's description continues on
to qualify this statement by explaining that public opinion, by this definition, cannot be solely
attributed to the faculties of “deliberate thought,” and in many ways is a culmination of environmental
factors and preexisting prejudices. The meaning of this interpretation is for Radio Sawa twofold; on
one hand it implies that by providing an additional context for dialog the endeavor may inherently
become one of the environmental factors that influences public opinion, but on the other it suggests that
these factors of environmental influence could be so numerous and simultaneously subtle that a single
agent will have no notable effect on the discourse as a whole.
Public opinion, in any case, has been an important player in terms of the ideological basis for
Radio Sawa. For a United Statesfunded station that “seeks to effectively communicate with the
youthful population of Arabicspeakers in the Middle East,” preexisting attitudes and the concurrent
37
38
39
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reality of opinions toward the United States are crucial.40 In 1952 Charles Glock, a social researcher at
Columbia University, boldly wrote that “in Islamic countries ... it is not as obvious as with us that such
knowledge [of current affairs] is essential or that having an opinion is important.”41 If Jordan or
anywhere else in the Arab world is to be considered such, contemporary research leaves almost no
doubt as to this statement's blatant inaccuracy. In fact, public opinion in this region – in regard to the
United States particularly – is among some of most strongly and unanimously voiced. According to a
2004 study published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, “only 1 percent of people surveyed in
June 2003 in Jordan or the Palestinian Authority” – both target locales for the Radio Sawa stream
broadcast from Amman  “expressed a favorable opinion of the United States.”42 This widespread
discontentment with American policy closely mirrors trends throughout the rest of the Arab world and,
according to the paper, many other predominantlyMuslim countries as well.
The aforementioned study takes this basic reality of opposition toward the United States and
makes an effort to examine some potential factors of its formation by means of statistics on both
education and media use, both elements that may play into the “composite” public opinion of which
Sedman writes.43 By examining data from the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World, the researchers
described their intentions as a motion to cast “light on the role of information in shaping attitudes and
beliefs.”44 If applicable in such a case the results of the study carry important implications as to the role
in public opinion Radio Sawa, as a media agent, can potentially play. The authors note, for example,
that “increased use of news media in this data is associated with more politically neutral knowledge,
but neither less misinformation nor more proU.S. attitudes.”45 This observation's suggestion is that
simple exposure to more information – however accurate – still does not often translate to a departure
from the normative political mood. The authors' conclusion that political attitudes, however, do tend to
correspond with frequent use of specific media sources (in this case either CNN or Al Jazeera) would
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be more significant had the elNawawy study not already concluded that such a phenomenon does not
appear to apply to Radio Sawa.46 In this regard, Radio Sawa's unique operating scenario in combination
with its programming format may place it as an anomaly in the context of its relation with public
opinion, and the effects that such an identity may preclude must be considered before approaching the
station as a typical media actor. Nonetheless, the author's concluding supposition that “exposure to a
broader range of information sources could reduce hostility to America” at least hints that Radio Sawa
holds the potential to act as one of these sources and consequently contribute to the dialog that shapes
public opinion.47 This issue, of course, is a research concern that will be addressed in the context of
Jordan specifically.

Research on Persuasive Communication and Credibility

As this study attempts to locate the nature of Radio Sawa's reception in Jordan, a review of
more broadlyapplicable theories of effective communication and targeted persuasion is among the
most critical of its necessary background investigations. The manner by which information obtained
from the media is parsed by its listeners is inherently related to the effect it may or may not have upon
them, and as such an application of these theories to Radio Sawa helps to identify other variables that
will determine the way it is perceived and the scope of its possible impact upon the audience. It will
also gage limitations on conclusions made from this particular study on the basis of sociological
phenomenon that can not be observed on a shortterm basis or qualitatively measured.
A 1978 study published in the Journal of Consumer Research took the issue of persuasive
power and attempted to identify the factors that play into it by quantifying their impact as independent
variables in a controlled experiment. The study postulates that the two primary issues affecting the
ability to persuade – and to ultimately influence opinion – are the credibility of the source and the
audience's preexisting notion of the issue at hand.48 “A message recipient's initial opinion,” it was
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hypothesized, “is an important determinant of influence.” A positive initial opinion was expected to
compliment the persuasive impact of the communicator, as was the communicator's identity as a high
credibility source. In terms of the opposite scenario, where both the communicator was perceived as
lacking credibility and the message recipient was negatively predisposed toward the content of the
message, the effectiveness of the persuasive appeal was predicted to be minimal.49 Completion of the
experiment led the researchers to conclude that, upon analysis of the final data, both aspects of the
hypothesis as detailed were indeed the case.50
When this particular model of effective persuasion and consequent influence over opinion is
applied to the case of Radio Sawa, important questions arise as to the factors that will define its ability
to affect its audience. First, the elements that play into its credibility as a communicator must be
identified. The United States government, as has been discussed, suffers a poor image throughout the
Arab world. If Radio Sawa, then, is recognized in the popular psyche as an extension of this
administration, its own credibility among listeners can be expected to follow the same lowrated path.
Such a demise in credibility, as demonstrated in the study cited above, would be a detriment to
persuasive power. Likewise, if the broadcasts emitted from Radio Sawa are perceived as portraying the
United States in a positive light, but listeners are already predisposed to negative attitudes toward the
United States, persuasiveness will be impeded. This point raises the essential question of balance, for if
Radio Sawa newscasts are perceived as neutral and accurate – rather than pandering directly to the
interests of the American government – they bear the potential to lighten this effect.
Research prior to the Sternthal study discussed above had likewise attempted to quantify
credibility through sociological experiments and came to similar conclusions in regard to its immediate
effect on persuasive power. A study published in a 1951 issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly entitled
“The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness” concluded that “significant
differences were obtained in the extent to which opinion on an issue was changed by the attribution of
the material to different sources,” despite the fact that the information received by the subject was in
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either case identical.51 Though not a primary concern of the research, a side note that “evaluations were
also affected by personal opinions on the topic before the communication was ever presented” also
heavily parallels the notions confirmed in the 1978 study of persuasive effects in its affirmation that a
subject's initial disposition plays into the potential for persuasion.52 Both of these observations reiterate
the centrality of the audiences' preexisting attitude toward a message and the identity of the source to
which it is attributed as means of measuring the effectiveness of a persuasive endeavor.
The 1951 authors' broader discussion of how an audience's perception of credibility relates to
fact acquisition and opinion change over a lengthier period of time, however, leaves room to believe
that even a source of perceived low credibility can have some communication merit. When subjects
were asked to recall factual information obtained from a source, for example, the researchers found that
“there is no significant difference” in how much could be recollected regardless of the source's
perceived credibility.53 In addition, the researchers expounded upon a preexisting hypothesis termed the
“sleeper effect,” in which over time a gradual disassociation of the communicated with the
communicator can translate into the listener accepting information obtained from a less credible source
in the same manner that information obtained from a more credible source would have been.54 Data
from the study revealed a correlation between an audience forgetting an information source and its
subsequent acceptance of a perspective that was initially rejected.
In application to Radio Sawa as a communicator, these latter two points are particularly
significant. In the case that this study does reveal that Radio Sawa is popularly associated with the
United States government and consequently is identified as lowcredibility source for this reason, they
hint that the station may still hold the potential to effectively communicate its messages and even
persuade despite such a hindrance. On one hand, the Hovland and Weiss study's indication that an
audience's reception of factual information is generally unconnected to credibility means that Radio
Sawa is likely to be equally effective in promoting awareness of the news and informational items that
51
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it chooses – regardless of how its intentions in doing so are perceived – as long as it has a sizable
audience. The second point, regarding the possibility of a “sleeper effect” where any persuasive
appeals may be initially rejected but then eventually accepted, indicates that even if Radio Sawa is
deemed to lack credibility it may not ultimately lose all of its effectiveness in persuasion. The resulting
necessity of qualifying any observations of opinion change into a more broadlyapplicable timeframe is
crucial in that even a definitive conclusion of present ineffectiveness of communication may not
necessarily point to the same outcome in the future.

Review of Critical Questions as Derived from these Contexts

When the above theories, history and rationale are utilized together as a foundation for studying
Radio Sawa in Jordan, they culminate in a set of individual questions from which the research has
drawn its bulk. Each of the following issues, therefore, was raised in discussion with research subjects
and will be elaborated upon in the study's findings.



What is the popular interpretation of the motivations for and goals of Radio Sawa, and how
does this compare to both the views of media professionals and the station's claims of intention?



Does its music, as claimed by most current literature, indeed constitute the majority of Radio
Sawa's attractiveness? What additional factors may have played into its original popularity in
Jordan, and is this scenario still the case?



How closely is Radio Sawa popularly associated with the United States government, and to
what degree is it viewed as a United States mouthpiece? How does this possible identity affect
the listening audience?



What is the general and comparative standing of radio as a news and information source in
Jordan?



Is there a perceived discrepancy, or conflict in nature, between the methods by which Radio
Sawa attracts and audience and its fundamental goals, or do these two spheres compliment each
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other?


What sort of attraction does Radio Sawa's nonmusic programming have for the current
listening audience?



Are Radio Sawa newscasts interpreted as having an “American slant” or imbalance, and if so
for which reasons?



How is the overall effectiveness of Radio Sawa gaged in terms of achieving its perceived goals?

Methodology

My initial plan as to the methodology of this investigation of Radio Sawa was multistranded,
and the preliminary model it had assumed prior to actually commencing was broader than that which
was ultimately employed. Originally, a central component of this study was to revolve around surveys
administered to Jordanian students at Amman's Jordan University, asking the students for personal
perspective on Radio Sawa and trying to quantity their responses into generalizable figures. After
discussion with instructors and careful consideration of its overall merit, however, this proposal was
left unpursued. The eventual decision to limit the sources for the study to a smaller group was made on
the basis of a variety of factors. On one account, while students would likely be both familiar with
Radio Sawa and able to provide viable responses to research questions, their role as a survey sample
that is adequately representative of the station's larger audience is questionable. Today's university
students may end up the individual decisionmakers of the next generation, but do their attitudes really
reflect that of the “Arab street,” a faction with its own power to drive policy as well? An entire study
could be devoted to such an issue alone, and to pursue the perspective a group that may not necessarily
be adequate spokespeople for the Sawa audience seemed unwise when there were alternative means of
research available. Even if this question was resolved, Mohammed elNawawy's 2006 study has
already profiled this sector more comprehensively than this study could hope to do given its alloted
time and resources. A different approach seemed more appropriate.
In lieu of interviewing students as members of the Radio Sawa audience, I decided to search out
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perspectives from individuals who carry the professional and academic merit to make pronouncements
on the station and its relationship with the broader Jordanian population, thereby limiting my field of
research to a group more suited to the project's scope. More specifically, I wanted to get in touch with
people whose careers and livelihoods are dependent upon and thereby necessitate understanding and
analysis of the social forces dictating media – and particularly radio – perception in Jordan. While open
to meeting with anyone who carried such qualifications and had the time to engage my research, I still
eventually found it possible to conceptually categorize all of my interviewees and contacts into one of
three strains of sources. The first was people associated with the operation of Radio Sawa itself, who
would be able to clarify the “official” standpoint of the station's administration as well as to provide
individual insight from the inside. The second was the “competition,” which consisted of other
professionals involved in the local Jordanian radio industry and promised to provide context for the
overall nature of radio in Jordan in addition to comments on Sawa specifically. The final, more all
inclusive source category was composed of individuals employed either in academia or other forms of
media who could comment on the same issues from a more neutrallyaffiliated standpoint.
Of these three groups, I had expected that the most problematic one to gain access to would be
that of Radio Sawa personnel. In simple terms of numbers, there are very few Sawaaffiliated
individuals in Jordan. The station is aired in the kingdom, but the content of the broadcast itself is
sculpted elsewhere, with the only Radio Sawa studios located in the United States and Dubai.55 Still, I
speculated, there had to be some nontechnical staff somewhere in the country who were monitoring
the reception of the venture. Some searches through news reports about Radio Sawa's launch revealed
that it had indeed had an office in Amman at some point in time, but my attempts to locate it physically
were completely unsuccessful. Later, I discovered that the office had been closed since the previous
year due to funding cuts. This failure was discouraging of its own accord, and I was additionally
worried that Radio Sawa's association with the United States government would wrap any progress I
did make with contacts in layers of bureaucratic red tape. Access to this important source seemed
highly elusive.
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All my concerns were assuaged, however, when I finally reached Dr. Mahmoud Zawawi, the
director of Radio Sawa in Jordan and formerly a longtime employee of the Voice of America. He was
personally able to engage the majority of my research questions and directed me to other contacts in
the United States who would be able to answer specific aspects of the study even more authoritatively.
These individuals provided a crucial voice for the Sawa endeavor that would compliment, contrast
with, and contextualize the responses of other research sources. In this light, the greatest challenge to
organizing the research material obtained from these Sawaassociated sources was the process of
dividing it into either the realm of concrete fact or that of fluid perspective, given both were provided
in the same interview setting. Information on Radio Sawa funding, for example, can generally be taken
at face value as asserted by individuals employed by the program; a declaration of its effectiveness,
however, is more debatable and could likely change in the eyes of another equallyinformed source.
The latter sort of information was therefore selected to be held in comparison to other perspectives as
part of the body of the study's findings and analysis, while the historical and factual information
provided by individuals with professional connections to Radio Sawa has been utilized to provide
background rationale.
Scheduling meetings with local radio professionals was on the whole a comparatively less
complicated task, as there are simply more numerous options one on count, and likewise because
connections between individuals in the industry appear strong. Contacts with whom I had already met
over the course of my research were very helpful in connecting me with new sources and providing
general assistance. Nonetheless, nearly all of the people in the upperlevel management of these
stations – the individuals with whom I most wanted to speak – appear to be keeping very busy
schedules, and some were unwilling to commit time to the research. Another access challenge arose
when I tried to contact stations with government ties, which retain relatively a significant role in the
radio marketplace given that Jordan only began to allow real privatization within the last few years,
mirroring a trend throughout much of the Arab world.56 Such organizations often place restrictions on
the sort of information that they can officially communicate without special permission. Even with
56
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these limitations, however, I was finally able obtain interviews at staterun Amen FM (commonly
known as the “police station”) as well as at Jordan Radio, the longeststanding station in the country
and one that continues to hold one of the most extensive networks of broadcasting services. In other
cases, my requests as a researcher were denied and I was instead redirected to a website with a small
selection of general information that, of course, made no reference to Radio Sawa at all. Despite these
minor complications, fortunately, the Jordanian radio professionals with whom I was able to speak
provided very relevant comments on Radio Sawa from the angle of competitors and colleagues for
whom the nature of audience perception is equally important.
Academic and nonradio sources were the most unexpectedly difficult interviewees to locate for
the project. Early in the beginning stages of my research, I arrived confidently at Jordan University and
began trying to locate the Journalism or Communications Department that I had assumed present there
so as to make such contacts. To my consternation, I soon discovered that despite its size, Jordan
University has no program of any journalistic nature. The only two journalism schools in the country
that I was able to locate are at Petra University, outside of Amman, and Yarmouk University in
neighboring Irbid. While I have only actually cited one professor associated with either of these two
schools, Dr. Issam Mousa, it is worth noting that other universityaffiliated contacts were instrumental
in putting me in touch with necessary project resources, and for this I am most grateful. Nonetheless,
relative trouble in locating relevant academic sources – many told me that they simply did not feel
familiar enough with Radio Sawa to comment upon it – to some degree prompted a larger focus on the
views of radioindustry professionals. Wary to discuss my findings without the perspective of at least
another individual with less ties to this single circuit, however, I searched for another source and was
eventually able to speak with Jamil alNimri, the director of the Jordanian Commission for Democratic
Culture and a regular contributor to Jordan Television.
On the whole I would estimate that less than a third of the qualified potential interview sources
that I made contact with were actually able to follow through with a personal meeting. For this reason
in particular I owe my most sincere gratitude to those individuals who did volunteer to assist in my
research, for despite the fact that their schedules were just as busy as others' they donated their time
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and hospitality to a student who had little to offer to them in return. Each one of the interviewees with
whom I met provided useful, relevant, and wellconsidered comments from an honest perspective. The
presence of disagreement among them only highlights the extent of the debate over Radio Sawa on
multiple levels. My experience as a researcher has cast light upon the effectiveness of networking
contacts in Jordan; whereas my association with a university has traditionally been my primary
introduction in any professional setting, I found that much better success scheduling visits and
meetings in many cases stemmed from detailing interpersonal connections and referencing shared
acquaintances. I again extend my thanks to the individuals who guided me through this combined maze
of Jordan's social and professional environments.
One of the issues that arose during the course of the research, ultimately requiring a slight
change of practice, was that of consent forms and related protection of my sources' integrity. Early into
the project I had compiled a comprehensive document requiring a signature to ensure informed
participation and planned to utilize it in the case of every interview, but following only the first
interview conducted I decided to reevaluate this intention. Jordanian interviewees seemed unclear as to
the purpose of the informed consent form and, when its nature was explained, quickly handed it back
with reassurance that I certainly could quote them in my research. Wanting to follow acceptable ethical
guidelines as a researcher, but concerned that forcing a paper upon interviewees would impede the
direct communication and personal atmosphere that was so crucial to the study, I discussed this issue
with my academic director. As all of the interviewees were prominent figures in the realms of public
media or academia, oral consent was ultimately deemed sufficient for this specific research,
particularly given it posed no significant threat of stress or harm to the individuals. In addition, I
attempted when possible to verify my notes from individual interviews by sending followup emails
with synopses of the information I had gleaned from the meeting to promote accuracy and provide
subjects an opportunity for additional comments and clarifications.
My command of Arabic is sufficient for many of the daytoday logistical requirements of a
student in Amman, but certainly nowhere near functional on an academic level, and the implications of
this personal limitation on me as researcher were a resounding concern as I began this project.
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Fortunately, the nature of my research topic played out in such a way that all of my interviewees spoke
English on a professional level. The lack of necessity for a translator meant that each of my sources'
comments could be parsed straightforwardly and utilized exactly as it was voiced, thereby ensuring that
valuable meaning was not lost and allowing me to personally pursue clarifications with ease. I was
delighted to find, however, that my studies as a student of Arabic remained somewhat valuable in an
unexpected manner. Being able to navigate while searching out offices in unfamiliar parts of Amman
helped ease much of my uncertainty as a student new to such research, and exchanging small niceties
in Arabic with my contacts again contributed to the relaxed setting that allowed more open dialog on
the academic topic at hand.
On an overall level I found Jordan to be an environment generally conducive to academic
research. I met the majority of interviewees in their offices, as was most convenient for them, and was
always greeted with the most hospitality. In most cases the interview style was very informal; I tried
not to rush into research questions before establishing personal commonality with the individuals who
had volunteered their time, and often conversations about family, school, and even politics were a
precursor to the questions I posed on Radio Sawa. For this reason, while I never requested more than
an hour of interviewees' time and stated that I could condense the interview into an even shorter
session, the length of some meetings stretched on to upwards of two hours or more. I was even given a
private tour of more than one radio studio. The mutually of these exchanges seemed to contribute
heavily to the straightforward and honest responses I was provided with for the study, and made it a
gratifying and thoroughly enjoyable learning experience as well.

Findings

The findings to follow were collected from individual research subjects and represent the debate
over – or in some cases agreement upon – the different issues related to Radio Sawa, as outlined in the
review of critical questions appended to the previous summary of rationale. The points as raised by
different interviewees will be interpreted and discussed alongside both each other and the literature
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based theories already provided as they are presented. An overall analysis, as well as suggestions of
areas for further research, will be drawn from these interpretations and discussions and will be detailed
in the conclusions.

Goals and Motivations

The nature of popular perception of Radio Sawa's aims and intentions is a central component of
the way in which it its reception plays out in Jordan. Despite much speculation otherwise, the station's
administration never directly states that it has any intention of changing public opinion in the region.
“Radio Sawa is committed to broadcasting accurate, timely and relevant news about the Middle East,
the world and the United States,” its official statements tend to default, “and, thereby, advancing the
longterm U.S. national interest of promoting freedom and democracy.”57 This notion of “freedom and
democracy,” however – or what a 2005 MBN presentation explicitly described as “the President's
policy in the region” – is often not interpreted in identical fashion in that region itself.58 The same
language has been used extensively as explanation for American policy in regard to Iraq and the
Palestinian territories, two of the issues toward which Arabs consider American policy most unfair and
unjustifiable, according to Dr. Issam Mousa of Jordan's University of Graduate Studies.59 Exerting its
oftunwanted influence upon the region and attempting to provoke internal change, that said, is a
legacy that inherently mars reception of United States endeavors in the Middle East in general, and
Radio Sawa is no exception. Few Jordanians believe that the station's mission is as simple as stated.
Even though its programming has acquired a radically different format from that of its
predecessor, the Voice of America, Radio Sawa is still commonly identified as a member of the same
ideological lineage. The station's administration recognizes this relationship as well, and cites the
provisions for the operation of Radio Sawa as reflective of “identical goals, policies and principles,”
heralding their implications as a mandate for accuracy and autonomy.60 In an interview, Radio Sawa's own Dr.
57
58
59
60

Kline, “Fact Sheet: Radio Sawa.”
Kline, “Continued Audience Growth for News and Information: Performance Update.”
Issam Mousa, personal interview, 8 May 2007.
Kline, “Frequently Asked Questions about Radio Sawa.”

31

Zawawi confidently stated that “there is no doubt that the Voice of America and Radio Sawa have the same
mission.”61 Other perspectives, on the other hand, do not identify the continuity between the two networks as
either a positive attribute or one that truly translates to these principles. Daoud Kuttab, the founder and general
manager of the radio station AmmanNet, also described Radio Sawa as “the daughter of the Voice of America”
with a “very smart initial business plan,” but insisted that the station exists in reality as an attempt to modify
opinions.62 Dr. Mousa also explicitly compared Radio Sawa to the Voice of America, but with no praise for the
association. “People think it's propaganda,” he explained.63 Disregarding the controversy over what its
relationship with Radio Sawa implies, the fact that each of these interviewees referenced the Voice of America –
though no specific mention was made of it in the questionnaire – demonstrates its history as a factor crucial to
Radio Sawa's current reception and signifies that this inherited legacy is one that the new station cannot easily
dispel.

Demonstrating agreement with Mr. Kuttab's claims, Radio Sawa was commonly described as a
component of a United States plan to influence opinion and reorient Arab political attitudes. Multiple
references, for example, were made to the “winning hearts and minds” rhetoric that United States
president George Bush has pushed in explanation of his administration's Middle East policy. Jamil al
Nimri, the director of the Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture and a regular contributor to
Jordan Television, specifically described Radio Sawa as an effort that has “been created to influence
the public opinion of youth.”64 Its real goal, he said, is not to provide entertainment but a cultural image
of the United States that will resonate well with Arab youth, by implication hoping to affect their
political attitudes. When Haitham Shibli, the Director of Foreign Programs at Jordan Radio, was asked
for his understanding of the station's intentions he responded similarly, saying that the station's
motivations are “to defend American policy” and that it hopes to succeed in “polishing the American
image.”65 Dr. Zawawi, however, disagreed with this interpretation of the station's motivation. An
“indirect objective” of Radio Sawa, he noted, is to serve as a public diplomacy tool to represent the
United States, and it could possibly make a minor positive contribution to the United States image.66 He
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nonetheless freely admitted that Radio Sawa will not make Arabs proAmerican, saying that the effects
of more than fifty years of unpopular policy cannot be reversed without a change in this political reality
itself.67
Mr. Shibli had made nearly the same comment, describing Arab attitudes toward the United
States as connected to policy and asserting that Radio Sawa “cannot change opinion.”68 When asked to
elaborate upon why he believed Radio Sawa would pursue such an aim if it was so obviously doomed
to be unproductive, he replied “I believe they just ignore it.” Dr. Zawawi's comments, however, show
that at least some of the station's administration perceives inherent limitations on the degree to which it
can have an effect on public discourse. If it does not seek to directly change opinions, that said, what is
Radio Sawa's purpose? Dr. Zawawi emphasized Radio Sawa as an avenue for dialog, explaining that its
independent broadcasting provides a previouslyunheard voice in a region where the dominant state
run media – including Jordan's – has traditionally filtered their press.69 This issue, regarding Radio
Sawa's potential as to act as an agent of open dialog, was afterwards integrated into later research
questions involving the station's effectiveness in obtaining perceived goals. Still, the dominant attitude
among sources was that despite no announced policy of prompting opinion change, this concern
remained Radio Sawa's primary goal. “No one will put money into a station,” Mr. Kuttab most simply
surmised, “just to play music.”70

Source of Popularity and Related Factors

Music, however, is the majority onair product of the funding that Radio Sawa receives, and
discussion with research subjects revealed nearly unanimous agreement that it has indeed been the
primary source of the station's numerical popularity since its launch. According to the Middle East
Broadcasting Networks' literature, this is exactly the model that had been intended, hoping to draw in a
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mass audience that would afterwards come to appreciate the station's other programming as well.71 Dr.
Zawawi's explanation of the way in which the station “became a hit with the kids” attributed it largely
to two factors: its innovative mix of Arabic and American popular music foremost, in combination with
its aroundtheclock broadcast policy (the Voice of America, by comparison, had aired only seven
hours per day).72 When the popularity issue was raised with Mr. Kuttab, he echoed this notion
immediately, describing Radio Sawa's alternation between Western and Arabic pop songs as a format
quick to gain audience response. “They did extremely well,” he said. “They were number one for a
while, you know.”73 According to Fardous alMasri, manager of the recentlyestablished station Sawt
AlMadena (“Voice of the City”) and a longtime journalist in the kingdom, the music on Radio Sawa
was key to the station's acquisition of a broad audience because it appealed to young people – a
majority of the Jordanian population – in particular.74 Identical or comparable answers were provided
by every other source interviewed.
Even with agreement upon the issue of music's contribution to the station's popularity, opinions
varied to some degree on both the influence of other factors as contributors to the station's success in
gaining an audience and the related potential for this success's continuity. While Radio Sawa is still a
major player in the Jordanian radio market, it has not maintained its original level of listenership
despite no significant change in its programming model, and this scenario indicates that additional
forces may have played into its popularity. Though it was the top radio station in Amman in 2003, for
example, by 2004 “Radio Sawa was number two.”75 Many sources cited this gradual decline in
popularity but provided different speculation for why it had become the case. At Jordan Radio, Mr.
Shibli framed the success of Radio Sawa as a passing fad, reiterating that statistics show its popularity
is “going down.” “Everything new attracts people,” he said.76 To the tune of other sources, Shibli also
commented that for Radio Sawa, “music is no longer an attractive point.” Other stations have cut out
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major segments of Radio Sawa's market share.77
Where were these competitor stations, then, when Radio Sawa was first launched in 2002 and
was greeted with such success? In actuality, the majority of them did not yet exist. Discussion with
other sources revealed the recent process of privatization as a significant factor for change in Jordan's
radio environment, and in many cases interviewees correlated its effects to the Radio Sawa narrative.
When the station replaced the Voice of America roughly five years ago, there were only a handful of
other radio stations on Jordanian airwaves, according Amen FM president Essam alOmary: two state
run stations, and a few foreign broadcasters including the BBC, Radio Monte Carlo and NBC.78 Around
a year later, Dr. Zawawi explained to the same tune, the Jordanian government's decision to begin
licensing radio frequencies to private stations began to produce competition that sought to attract an
audience on a model similar to that which Radio Sawa had employed.79 He said that one of the first of
these stations, Radio Fann (“Art”), was essentially a “complete imitation of Radio Sawa” and was
likewise successful in building a large audience soon after its launch.80 According to Mr. Kuttab of
AmmanNet, this process of privatization really began to accelerate in 2004, a trend that his formerly
Internetbased station would capitalize on in the summer to follow.81 Today, said Mrs. alMasri at Sawt
alMadena, there are twentyeight stations broadcasting on local FM frequencies.82
The degree to which this sudden boom in private radio broadcasting has affected Radio Sawa's
viability in the Jordanian market was debated among interviewees, though the fact that it has had some
impact on the station's popularity was never denied. Dr. Zawawi stressed that while the increase in
available stations – many of which replicated Radio Sawa's previously unique music format – did
undercut some of its audience base, the station has managed to retain its position among the top radio
broadcasters in Jordan.83 Being the first in a trend, as Radio Sawa's music programming seemed to be,
may have its continuing advantages. Not all radio professionals, on the other hand, agree that the
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American endeavor's appeal has persisted through the changes brought about by the industry's recent
deregulation. Radio Sawa's music content was appealing, admits Mr. Kuttab, and the station came in at
the right logistical time to capitalize on its formula. At the same time, “their success was their demise,”
he observed, referring to “copycatting.”84 Other interviewees echoed this doubtful tone. “There are so
many stations now available,” noted Dr. Mousa, and they account for “a lot of competition.”85 Radio
Sawa was popular, agreed Mr. alOmary, but he replied in kind in saying that the station holds no
longer holds a monopoly on the popular music format it was known for. “Other stations,” too, “know
what the listeners need.”86

Association with US Government and Implications

Given it has already been established that the United States government lacks popularity on
account of its policies in the region and suffers low credibility as an information source, the extent of
Radio Sawa's popular association with this American administration remains the pivotal factor that
threatens to link its reception to the attitude of distrust common to Arab dialog involving the United
States. Middle East scholars have already leveled claims that the station cannot escape this
identification. According to William Rugh, “Radio Sawa is regarded as a U.S. government sponsored
station. Arab listeners are experienced in detecting who is behind a given broadcaster, and they sensed
that the news and public affairs programs were sponsored by the American government.”87 Mr. al
Omary agreed with this sentiment, explaining that Radio Sawa cannot escape its connection to politics.
The station, he noted, is associated with the foreign ministry of the United States. “It's wrong,” he
followed – again, American overseas broadcasting's legal framework technically does separate it from
the State Department, and some Jordanian radio professionals make this distinction – but the average
radio listener remains blind to any autonomy that Radio Sawa claims to have. “That's what they
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think.”88 Mr. Shibli made the same comment almost verbatim, insisting that “everybody knows Radio
Sawa is the voice of the foreign ministry of the United States.”89
Even if not this explicit, none of the interviewees disagreed that most Jordanian listeners at least
recognize Radio Sawa as a station with American affiliations. “The overwhelming majority,” according
to Dr. Zawawi, sees Radio Sawa in this light. Still, he did not believe that this association detracts from
the station's audience exposure; in fact, he mentioned that it may provide even better reason to listen
for Jordanians who realize that the United States' role as a superpower makes it at least worth hearing.
“You may not like the United States,” he elaborated, “but at the same time, you can't ignore it.”90 Mrs.
alMasri, towing more middle ground, again stated that “everyone knows” to whom the Sawa initiative
belongs. For this reason some people refuse to listen, she explained, but “openminded people want to
hear it.”91 Mr. Kuttab adopted a similar stance, saying that while some Jordanians will refuse to listen
out of principle – because Radio Sawa is an “American station” – for “some people it doesn't matter...
they just want a good song.”92 Other sources, however, commented that the effect a recognition of the
station's governmental ties has upon Radio Sawa is almost exclusively detrimental. Mr. Shibli
speculated that the station would be much more effective in lieu of the mutual identification with the
United States government that he had previously detailed. “Nobody is willing to listen to the American
view,” he said. “They should hide that it's an American station.”93

Radio as a News Source in Jordan

In order to determine the background tone for the specific comments they would make on
Radio Sawa and its news programming, interviewees were asked to provide their conceptualization of
Jordan's news radio environment in a general sense. This question was approached differently
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depending on the source, with some individuals opting for a more historical angle while others
compared the standing of radio to that of other media types. The overall state of Jordanian news radio,
nonetheless, is a crucial factor contributing to Radio Sawa's reception because the station itself must
operate within the limitations inherent to this individual matrix. Comments revealed that even though
some common threads run through sources' answers to the question, major debates remain in terms of
both radio's comparative importance as a news source and the public demand for news over other
forms of radio programming.
Approaching from a historical angle, Daoud Kuttab was quickly critical of the state of news
radio in both the kingdom and wider region. “It has been quite bad,” he said. “Basically, government
has controlled news radio.”94 These statecontrolled broadcasts, he continued, have traditionally been
unable to garner the genuine faith of their respective countries' citizens. Mr. Kuttab described the case
of the Egyptian station Sawt alArab (“Voice of the Arabs”) during the 1967 ArabIsraeli war, where
the station triumphantly announced impending victory when exactly the opposite was true, as the
prototypical failure of Arab news radio's credibility. Wary of such significant failures, news seekers in
the Arab world will often “go to the BBC.”95 Dr. Issam Mousa made note of the same phenomenon,
saying that while news radio is certainly “important,” it is also “natural to check between more than
one source” because of this very issue of credibility.96 With the advent of the industry deregulation
discussed previously, however, the longstanding dynamic of statedictated broadcasting is beginning to
change, and other interviewees' comments showed signs of optimism at the public's growing trust in
radio news. Though hailing from a government station himself, Jordan Radio's Haitham Shibli
enthusiastically cited recent market studies as indicative of a rekindled interest in programming of this
nature. People in Jordan now listen to radio, he repeated, for news.97
Amen FM's Essam alOmary, that said, did not agree with attributing news such an elevated
status. He described the elements of radio programming as a sort of threestepped ladder, where news
was actually the bottom rung. “Fun and service,” he said, are in foremost demand. The programming
94
95
96
97

Kuttab.
Ibid.
Mousa.
Shibli.

38

that is actually more wanted than the news, he said, is that pertaining to religion. News itself suffers
relatively low priority among listeners.98 Still, alOmary's comments were the only to cite this
phenomenon, and are met with disagreement from other radio professionals, Mrs. alMasri among
them. The tiering that Mr. alOmary described may be representative of the current offerings on FM
airwaves – programming today, she noted, is “mostly for entertainment” – but she insists that the
market has in actuality been overflooded with music and entertainment programming, and what is aired
is not reflective of what is desired by listeners. She placed emphasis on a growing demand for what she
termed “new news:” listenerinteractive and locallybased stories that as of yet receive little airtime
even on dedicated newsonly stations.99 This viewpoint to some degree resounds with Mr. Shibli's
assertion that radio news programming is ballooning in relative importance, but to another differs in
that the news Mrs. alMasri referenced is neither that of a traditional national nor internationallevel
nature.
Approaching the issue of news radio from the different personal angle of a nonradio media
professional, Jamil alNimri was more doubtful as to its overall significance among other forms of
media. Radio is not much of a source, he explained, in comparison to other outlets. Television and
newspapers, by alNimri's account, are the major front for news in Jordanian society. But “people in
cars usually listen to radio,” he allowed. “And the youth.”100 Dr. Zawawi, while not necessarily in
disagreement, approached the issue differently in his emphasis that these two audiences are exactly the
ones that keep radiobroadcast news viable. “Radio will always have an audience,” he said, because
“you don't need eyes.” Not only drivers are likely to be listening to the radio, he elaborated, but people
involved in routine tasks at home and at work are as well.101 This guarantee of a continued “captive
audience” – whether they consider radio to be their primary news source or not – is central to the logic
behind the investment in Radio Sawa as a media endeavor.102 As long as the station can offer something
Jordanians something they want, they will probably be there to listen.
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Relationship Between Spheres of Entertainment and Information

The nature of the perception of Radio Sawa's format, as a multicontent broadcaster, was
another issue posed as a question to research participants. Its significance lies in that if listeners
consciously interpret Radio Sawa's entertainmentbased programming as a ploy to gain their audience
for nonentertainment realms – which to a degree is what Middle East Broadcasting Networks
literature says it is, apologetically denying that it is simply providing music for people's pleasure – the
sense of dishonesty conveyed could again negatively affect the station's credibility as a newscaster.
Given a combination of the general attitudes that music was employed to attract Radio Sawa's audience
and that it's underlying intention was to expose this audience to its news, interviewees were asked if
this dualcontent broadcast was either selfcomplimentary or conflicting in nature. Answers to this
question were realized as divided opinions. Generally, people in the radio industry were less likely to
perceive a discrepancy in the relationship between the two sphere spheres, though some did.
Jordan Radio's Haitham Shibli, for example, saw no problem in elevating news and
informational programs' exposure by way of popular demand for entertainment. “This is an old game
of radio,” he said, referring to traditional broadcasting strategies.103 Wary to imply that Radio Sawa
necessarily benefits from this format today, however, he qualified the statement, saying that a
continuing trend toward specialization is moving norms away form the mixedmode broadcasts that
had once been so effective. Dr. Mahmoud Zawawi, by contrast, did not note this phenomenon. He said
that the two sides of Radio Sawa's programming do indeed compliment each other, and stressed that
the station's splitcontent broadcasting is the result of a specific strategic choice.104 Some critics in the
United States, he also mentioned, have accused Radio Sawa of “just playing music.” He dismissed
these claims, clarifying that newscasts have progressively been expanded as the station has gained
audience and remain a key focus of its administrative attention.105 Comments from Mrs. alMasri
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mirrored these sentiments as she explained that music and news together can help each other,
mentioning the diversity of programming styles on her own young station.106
Other sources were much more critical of Radio Sawa's programming strategy, though in each
case the detailed discrepancies in its nature were connected to the station's perceived political goals. At
the Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture, Jamil alNimri immediately responded by saying
“yes, there is a conflict.”107 People accept the music, he said, but do not accept the political message
that he believes the United States is trying to sell to Radio Sawa listeners. Even left to the news
programming alone, Mr. alNimri was unconvinced that the Radio Sawa format was suitable for its
goals. “It's easy to listen to short news,” he said, referring to the station's tendency towards brief reports
and summaries, “but hard to deliver a message.” Daoud Kuttab's comments fell in line with this idea as
he repeated the concept of a programming conflict.108 People recognize Radio Sawa's political
associations and intentions, he explained, and these elements neither compliment its entertainment
airings not are complimented by them. Listeners may tune in for a song they like, but it will not draw
them into a news dialog they do not want to hear. “People are quick,” he pronounced, “to shift the
station.”109

Attractiveness of NonEntertainment Programming

Along lines similar to those of the previous question, interviewees were asked subsequently to
expound more upon issues involving the attractiveness Radio Sawa's news, informational and opinion
offerings exclusively. As in responses to many other questions posed, answers in this instance again
heavily hinged upon the concept of Radio Sawa's popular association with the United States
government. The implications of this relationship, however, were explained as both assistance and
detriment to the value of the station's nonentertainment programming. Dr. Zawawi had claimed
beforehand, for example, that even if Jordanians interpreted Radio Sawa as the direct voice of the
106
107
108
109

AlMasry.
AlNimri.
Kuttab.
Ibid.

41

American government, they were still apt to listen to it if for nothing more than vested personal interest
in hearing out the world's superpower.110 Others, such as Mr. Shibli, had declared that listeners had no
interest in hearing the “American view,” and thereby the station's airings of this nature remain without
appeal.111
The latter sentiment resounds more with the general attitudes interviewees provided, though
some agreement that particular elements of Radio Sawa's nonentertainment programming formula are
appropriate to its goals could be found. Radio Sawa's Dr. Zawawi referred primarily to the news, which
he quickly described as “attractive too.” It's fast, he said, and “this appeals to many people.”112 Even if
people don't want to hear them specifically, the newscasts are at least short enough that listeners will
tolerate them between songs, he continued, and this means that audiences attracted by the station's
entertainment programming will be exposed to the dialog it wants to open. In addition, Radio Sawa
newscasts are reliable as they air consistently at quarter until and quarter after the hour – most stations
play news on the hour, giving Radio Sawa an effective monopoly on news radio at these times – and
regular listeners know they won't have to wait long for an update.113 These ideas found mild support
among other radio professionals. “People don't like to read,” said Fardous alMasri, and this news
makes communication easier and more accessible.114 Daoud Kuttab likewise agreed that condensed
news can be attractive. The main problem Radio Sawa faces in regard to its newscast attractiveness, he
nonetheless speculated, is that “their target audience doesn't care too much for the news.”115
That said, if there is an audience searching out its news, Radio Sawa does carry an advantage in
that it is both licensed to broadcast it and has resources and scope with which local stations cannot
compete. The network has around fifty reporters in the region, including four in Jordan, which allows it
to report firsthand on major international issues.116 Both Mr. Kuttab and Mrs. alMasri, however, noted
that the broader focus of Radio Sawa's news may actually detract from its viability. Even though al
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Masri had mentioned Sawa's appeal to an “openminded” audience, she qualified this statement by
saying that Radio Sawa was generally not a first choice for news. People trust local sources more, she
elaborated, and foreign news is considered better available from other sources such as television and
newspapers.117 Mr. Kuttab expressed this notion as well, repeating that Radio Sawa's news “is not
localized enough.”118 “Media,” he said, “has to be indigenous.” If people do want to leave this local
realm in exchange for regional news, he continued, they are again much more likely to go to the
BBC.119 The concept of indigenousness was echoed by Haitham Shibli. “Radio should be a friend,” he
said, and encompass all the positive attributes that friendship implies. “People want to hear someone
who speaks their language,” he insisted, and in their own accent as well.120 Both literally and
metaphorically Radio Sawa does neither – newscasts are in Modern Standard Arabic, not Jordan's local
dialects, and Shibli again stressed that people perceive an American message – so for now, the station
remains a foreigner.

Objectivity and the “American Slant” Issue

The issue of balance and objectivity lies among some of the most crucial aspects of the current
perception of Radio Sawa in Jordan as well as any ability it may have to affect national discourse. As
already discussed in the literaturebased rationale, a source's credibility and a listener's relative
disposition to its message have been demonstrated to be the two significant factors that play into its
persuasive ability. Jordanians' sense of Radio Sawa's slant, or lack of one, lies at the root of both of
these variables. In terms of the former, if listeners perceive an inherent imbalance in the actual content
of Radio Sawa's news, they will likely relate it to the station's failure to act as a credible source. In the
latter context, a perceived imbalance in reporting could exasperate any disparity between the messages
Radio Sawa airs and the preexisting opinions of its audience, thereby impeding persuasiveness and
overall communication effectiveness. When confronted with this notion, interviewees gave different
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personal accounts of the station's objectivity but often noted that, on the whole, an audience's
preconception of intention may produce more allegations of bias than actual analysis of content.
Radio Sawa's official stance is a claim to objectivity. In 2005 Joaquin Blaya, Chairman of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors Middle East Committee, declared that “by attracting a broad
audience and giving them accurate and objective news, Radio Sawa is a perfect example of combining
the mission to the marketplace.121 Other Radio Sawaaffiliated literature does not shy away from
similar claims, and personnel on the ground echo this notion. “Newswise,” said Dr. Zawawi, “Radio
Sawa is very balanced.”122 He explained that Radio Sawa's news content is not dictated by the United
States government or any other external source, and said news items are chosen by their importance on
the regional radar, not on the basis of the government's political concerns. During the American
invasion of Iraq, for example, Radio Sawa spent significant time broadcasting Saddam Hussein's voice
as he released messages to the press.123 These claims to autonomy do have grounding in Radio Sawa's
legal framework as well, regardless of whether or not listeners (as William Rugh warns) actually
appreciate them. While Radio Sawa, for example, is a grantee that receives finances as a federal
subsidiary, it is not actually part of the federal government. In addition, to secure continued funds
Radio Sawa must abide by the 1994 U.S. International Broadcasting Act, which requires that its news
be “consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and comprehensive.”124 While the extent
of adherence to these guidelines is an issue of its own, they do set legal precedent that could threaten
harsh retribution if blatantly violated.
Surprisingly enough, even some of the interviewees who were otherwise overtly critical of
Radio Sawa were wary to approach the topic of balance so directly. At AmmanNet, Mr. Kuttab was
hesitant to summarize its news objectivity in any overarching manner. He questioned the station's
process of news item selection – which stories are chosen or not – but said that the presentation of the
news stories that are selected is actually relatively balanced.125 Mrs. alMasri of Sawt AlMadena skirted
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the issue somewhat, saying that from a political analysis of Radio Sawa's news, “you feel its not for
you sometimes,” but declining to say that the station was necessarily biased.126 Dr. Issam Mousa
presented the most complex picture of Radio Sawa's news, in a sense painting the station as so bent on
being perceived as objective that its catering to Arab sentiment comes across as even more dishonest
than its real intentions.127 “I find that Radio Sawa is not expressive of the real American attitude toward
the Palestinians in particular,” he elaborated, anecdotally describing its interviews with Palestinian
Authority officials as having provided them legitimacy that American policy itself would never
grant.128 This lack of congruence with policy, as he described it, may provide a sort of “antislant” that
actually harms Radio Sawa's news credibility more than a direct favorable bias towards American
interests. At least, then, people could be sure of for whom the station was trying to speak.
Others, however, noted that Jordanians may already be so convinced that Radio Sawa is an
American voice that they render the question of its objectivity negligible. In short, if people assume
Radio Sawa reflects the American policy they so strongly oppose, they may refuse to listen to its non
entertainment portions from the start. “When you choose to be the devil's advocate,” said Mr. Shibli,
capturing this attitude, “you can't defend your actions.”129 People's preexisting attitudes toward the
United States, he explained, give them reason to ignore the station. “I have to trust you before I
listen.”130 Mr. alNimri's comments mirror this assertion closely. When asked about Radio Sawa's state
of news balance, he replied that it was not a very relevant issue on a broader scale. Even accuracy, al
Nimri continued, won't help the United States' image or Jordanians' perception of the station. The
reality of United States policy itself simply evokes no positive response.131 Still more interviewees
agreed, detailing popular concerns that exposure to Radio Sawa's news may translate to playing into the
hands of the United States itself or possibly those of an even more unpopular regional force. “I think
they're afraid it serves Israeli politics,” Essam alOmary elaborated.132
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Dr. Mousa, a communications specialist, noted the same issue of preconceptions and the effects
they may have on perceptions of Radio Sawa's objectivity. “Even if you tell the truth,” he related,
“people don't buy it.” “You have to build better bridges than media.”133 Despite this generalization, he
afterwards contextualized this relationship in the light of a comparable scenario that has seen different
results, leaving room for the possibility that Radio Sawa could overstep some of it inherited obstacles
as an American offspring. Much like other interviewees, he brought up the case of the BBC, a
governmentlinked media corporation that has established remarkable reputability in Jordan as well as
throughout other parts of the Middle East. “I trust the BBC more,” he said, “and a lot of people do the
same.”134 But British policy is for the most part just as unpopular in the region as American policy,
which it often reflects, he continued. There are British troops as well in Iraq, but people don't trust the
BBC any less in the way that they do associate Radio Sawa with United States policy. This, Dr. Mousa
explained, is because “the BBC has been building that measure of confidence” for many years. People
in the Middle East know that it is affiliated with the British government, but the BBC has established
its autonomy nonetheless and gained their trust. Radio Sawa, however, has yet to do so.135

Effectiveness in Achieving Goals

As a final followup to other questions, research participants were asked to define their overall
conceptualization of Radio Sawa's effectiveness in achieving its goals in Jordan. To a large degree,
these evaluations varied depending on individuals' own perceptions of Radio's Sawa's underlying
motivations. While most attitudes were on the whole skeptical, the major agreement that was found
among interviewees dealt with the issue of Radio Sawa's popularity. As discussed previously, the
overarching agreement among interviewees that Radio Sawa's music policy was an effective means of
establishing mass appeal indicates that the station has indeed been effective in achieving some of its
stated goals. At the very least, it has been heard. “When a foreign station becomes number one in three
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months,” asserted Dr. Zawawi, this is a great success story in my mind.”136 Other interviewees agreed
that the station had done remarkably well on these terms, especially given its common association with
United States government, regardless of the additional forces that may have assisted the station's
popularity.137 Even if Radio Sawa's underlying goals are more complex than that of simply garnering an
audience, the station must have adequate exposure to pursue them, and in this regard it has been
particularly effective.
Sources who believed that Radio Sawa's intentions are to change opinion and to persuade Arab
listeners to adopt a proAmerican stance, however, evaluated the station's perceived effectiveness very
poorly. “I don't think it has a future in the Arab world,” Mr. Shibli said. “It's a matter of culture.”138 Mr.
Kuttab made comparable comments, but on an even more broadly applicable level. “The idea that radio
itself can change opinion,” he decreed, “is ridiculous.”139 He said that Radio Sawa in particular will not
change opinion, because “opinions are made because of action,” referring to United States policy in the
region. This idea of policy as the principle player in the process of public opinion formation, assigning
media a relatively insignificant role, was common to even more interviewees. As Dr. Mousa had
mentioned, it is considered a much more important “bridge” than any media effort.140 Each of these
observations falls into line with a concluding point in Mohammed elNawawy's 2006 study, where he
summarizes his personal understanding of the issue in noting that “this researcher believes that actions
speak louder than words. It is only when the Arabs see a US policy that reflects their own interests that
they will trust the Americansponsored channels or any other form of public diplomacy.”141 This
general sentiment – in the case that the station really is trying to affect opinion after all – hints that the
forces controlling Radio Sawa's effectiveness fall largely outside of its own reach as single entity.
The emphasis that Dr. Zawawi, as an individual who works for Radio Sawa, had placed on the
potential ability of Radio Sawa to open a dialog cannot be ignored in an evaluation of the station's
effectiveness. By providing a viable alternative to the tradition of staterun or selfcensored media, he
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said, the station can contribute to popular intellectual discourse in the region. It will sometimes, for
example, criticize aspects of Jordanian policy that remain untouched by local media.142 Comments that
did relate to this issue, on the other hand, were largely disfavorable, referring back to the effects its
popular association with the United States has on the station's authenticity in the eyes of its audience.
According to Mr. Kuttab, Radio Sawa's own identity as a government station sets a poor precedent for
this notion of free dialog, especially given the distrust staterun media outlets have acquired in the
Middle East.143 This tone was echoed by other interviewees in their responses to questions of balance
previously discussed. The actual steps that a governmentaffiliated station may take to open a dialog, it
appears, are trumped by the popular assumption that such media will be closed off by nature. Such a
concern toward Americanaffiliated broadcasting is not new to its history. As early as January of 1946,
after having provided the Voice of America with wire service news during World War II, the
Associated Press withdrew this service alongside a paralell assertion: “governments cannot engage in
newscasting without creating the fear of propaganda which necessarily would reflect upon the
objectivity of the news service from which such newscasts are prepared.”144 If Radio Sawa is to open a
dialog today, that said, it will likely have to comprehensively address the implications of this same
longstanding issue beforehand.
Claims of overall effectiveness, of course, must be understood as an interpretation of different
perceptions that can vary from individual to individual. Two of the most significant of these
perceptions – and the ones that have the greatest effect upon subsequent gaging of this effectiveness –
are that Radio Sawa is an arm of the United States government and that its goal is to change Arab
opinion. Contextualized in Radio Sawa's own selftestimony, however, the former of these notions is
explicitly denied and the latter allegation remains at most unspoken. Given this discrepancy, the
question that must be raised is not which of which of these narratives is more accurate, but which is
more representative of the way in which Jordanian listeners actually perceive Radio Sawa. Judging by
parallels of current findings to preexisting discourse on Radio Sawa, the author is inclined to believe
142
143
144

Zawawi, 25 April 2007.
Kuttab.
Paulu Burton, “The Voice of America and Wire Service News,” The Quarterly of Film Radio and Television, Vol. 6,
No. 1., Autumn 1951, p. 31.

48

that listeners tend not to recognize the station's official declarations and do indeed see Radio Sawa as
exclusive American bid to affect the Arab perspective of the United States. Again, the veracity of this
perception is not deemed as important as the much more qualifiable effects it will have on popular
evaluation of the station's success. In this regard, and as discussed in the Sternthal study of 1978,
audience preconception appears to indict any persuasive appeals Radio Sawa may air and condemn its
effectiveness by default, even if such persuasion is not its true motivation. The station, Kuttab
representatively stated, will have no real success in changing perspectives; it will not win “hearts and
minds.” But “Radio Sawa has helped articulate the needs of young people,” he said. “And that's
music.”145

Conclusions

Having presented the findings of the research as contributed by the media professionals
involved, the following section will proceed to briefly summarize and analyze the general attitudes
presented while simultaneously providing any remaining context of necessity. Where debates remain
present among sources, possible explanations for such discrepancy will be presented on the basis of
background literature. In the case of agreement among all the various interviewees, the author feels that
it is appropriate to – given certain qualifications as necessary – consider them applicable conclusions to
be held to the light of the original hypotheses.
Opinions voiced by research participants have arrived at consensus in some important areas
regarding the reception of Radio Sawa in Jordan. The station has been widely popular in the recent
past, though the current trajectory of this popularity remains a debate. Almost all interviewees cited its
music programming policy as Radio Sawa's active method of appeal, but likewise agreed that the full
success of this format may to some degree pay tribute to the highlyregulated industry into which
Radio Sawa entered that has since changed. As also discussed, the majority of Jordanians recognize
Radio Sawa as an American endeavor. While the nature of the direct effects of this popular association
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are a matter of debate, its role as a determiner of Radio Sawa's perception in Jordanian society arises as
particularly significant. In cases where the audience perceives the station as a lowcredibility
newscaster, for example, this perception can often be correlated to general distrust of United States
foreign policy. This policy, as well, is a central concern of Jordanians' and one whose voice many
potential listeners are wary of being exposed to by means of the Radio Sawa endeavor. While the issue
of the station as a representative spokesperson for the American administration is up for debate,
general attitudes also reflected that Radio Sawa holds no potential to dramatically change perspectives
or opinion in a political climate where actions resound with much more force than any media endeavor.
The author believes that all of the above perspectives can be taken as conclusions, but that the
issue of Radio Sawa's potential as a persuasive force must be revisited for clarity. While the notion that
the station can not change aggregate opinion remains well grounded in both this research and prior
literature, studies of persuasion and credibility must be kept in mind as possible creditors of merit in
that they inhibit completely ruling out the potential for any effects upon opinion that Radio Sawa may
be able to produce. It again must be kept in mind that, referring back to Virginia Sedman's 1932
discussion of public opinion, not all of the forces that dictate overall opinion can be credited to
conscious thought or faculty. Connecting a conscious rejection of Radio Sawa's messages – as seems to
often be the case with its Jordanian listeners – with an ineffectiveness of persuasion, then, is a leap that
must be approached with caution. The idea that Radio Sawa could act more subtly, in a manner unseen
by its audience, to gradually affect outlook remains a possibility if it can indeed be integrated as one of
the “environmental factors” Sedman speaks of. The author argues that it will meet this requirement to
some degree as long as it can maintain a sizable audience, and that Radio Sawa may therefore be able
to make persuasive appeals if that is its intention, though never as effectively as it could if actively
received as a media source of more positive standing instead.
This assertion is likewise supported by the 1952 Hovland and Weiss study as well as the 1978
Sternthal study in their respective discussions of credibility and persuasion. Returning to the discovery
that Radio Sawa is widely associated with the United States government, the findings also generally
confirm that the the station, as predicted, suffers a loss of credibility because of this identification. A
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majority of interviews agreed that, in line with the both of the aforementioned studies' conclusions, the
station's communication effectiveness and persuasion is ultimately impeded for this reason. Findings
also commonly refer to the concept of preconceptions and predispositions as detailed in the Sternthal
study and agree that since many of Radio Sawa's listeners perceive its messages as contrary to their
opinions, it will suffer a loss of persuasive ability. Given these studies' general applicability, however,
it is a necessity to apply the possibilities in communication they leave open to this particular study as
well. The “sleeper effect,” as Hovland and Weiss termed it, poses the possibility that listeners may
gradually disassociate Radio Sawa, as the communicator, from the messages that it communicates, and
in turn eventually accept these messages despite an initial rejection since the rejection occurred only on
the basis of the source's perceived lack of credibility. The same study's interpretation of explicit factual
acquisition as generally uncorrelated with credibility also holds notable implications for Radio Sawa,
for if its intention is to open dialog and serve as a viable information source it appears that the truly
applicable variable is its exposure to an audience, regardless of credibility. This concept may be
paralleled to the findings in the 2004 Gentzkow and Shapiro study, claiming no correlation between
media source and – looking at the same spectrum from the opposite angle – misinformation.
The issue of credibility remains significant because, as theorized previously, it could boost
Radio Sawa's direct effectiveness as a communicator dramatically to the point that these lesser effects
would be comparatively negligible. The author foresees two manners by which Radio Sawa may
ultimately be able to witness a change the low credibility as an information source it has been deemed
to carry in Jordanian society both through previous research and the findings of this study. The first
one assumes that Radio Sawa will continue to bear its association with the American government, but
that attitudes toward this administration on the part of the Arab world will experience a drastic change
in nature either on account of American policy shifts themselves or other extraneous factors, and this
transformation will be transferred to the station. As the ability to judge the likeliness of such an
occurrence lies outside the context of this study, however, this possibility will be left unresolved. The
second, and probably more likely, option by which Radio Sawa's credibility may see a redefinition lies
in the potential that the station – despite a static Arab attitude toward the United States government –
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may be able to shake off its current association with this government and gradually gain popular
identification as an autonomous and reliable media source. The most obvious parallel precedent lies in
the case of the BBC, which was widely cited in findings as a radio source that Jordanians trust and
utilize despite widespread opposition to British foreign policy, mirroring views of the United States'
involvement in the region. To replicate such a scenario, however, Radio Sawa will likely have to be
more straightforward in recognizing news seekers as a primary audience and will also have to build its
credibility over a long span of time, in lieu of immediate results.
Having established the importance of a continuing audience to Radio Sawa's potential
effectiveness in any goals it may have, we come to an important point of argument that points to new
focuses arising from the research. The current narrative, as constructed by research sources, recounts
Radio Sawa's remarkable rise in popularity followed by a gradual decline that came alongside
privatization and increased competition on an entertainment level. The station's contemporary ability to
hold on to its existing market share – the trajectory of its popularity – is met with no conclusions as to
its nature. The author, on this note, strongly emphasizes the need for increased research in the
Jordanian Radio industry on the whole. As mentioned in the findings, this industry has seen an
unprecedented boom that has produced more stations in three years than the kingdom had had in its
entire previous history. Deregulation of a traditionally governmentrestricted media sphere and a
subsequent capitalization from the private sector appear to be the factors that have changed Radio
Sawa's operating environment so drastically. To most effectively contextualize the station's challenges
in this industry and the effects its continuing transformation may have on Radio Sawa's audience, a
more indepth and broadlybased study must be undertaken that will not only locate trends in
popularity of individual stations but the elements that dictate them as well. In addition, the author
recommends an extension of research on the comparative standing of radio as a news source in Jordan,
for this question was approached differently depending on the source. Findings of such research would
contribute to the context for this particular study and also shed more light on various issues of
significance to Jordan's process of modernization, among them the process of media reception and
interplay between public and private spheres.
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A final issue that must be addressed, given that Radio Sawa is a regional initiative not only
limited in scope to Jordan, is the representativeness of the current findings outside of the kingdom. The
author contends that this study is very likely applicable to such a regional context for a variety of
reasons, in that the background environment for the station's reception in the larger Arab world and
many of its affecting factors are either comparable or identical to the respective scenario in Jordan.
Radio Sawa's operative format is one of the issues that makes this parallel viable as the station's
programming style and policies see no change from country to country, with the one exception of Iraq.
In terms of reception environment, general sentiment toward the United States is comparably low in
other parts of the Arab world, suggesting no major variation in the preconceptions and predispositions
toward Radio Sawa's messages that are so integral to the station's reception in Jordan. Yet another
similarity between Jordan and the rest of the region that has been shown to be crucial to understanding
Radio Sawa in the country is its history of staterun media in combination with a recent shift toward
privatization. As mentioned before, this trend is reflective of developments occurring elsewhere in the
Middle East and it is likely that their effects upon Radio Sawa in other Arab countries will mirror those
that they have had in Jordan. Finally, the small existing research base on Radio Sawa must be recalled
and addressed. The 2006 Mohammed elNawawy study that gaged Radio Sawa's news credibility,
drawing from five different Arab states, noted no significant difference between results obtained in
Jordan and those that occurred elsewhere. The author sees no reason to believe that such a congruency
in results would not apply to other issues involving Radio Sawa, across the region, as well.
Taking all the findings into light, maybe the one most unanimous but asofyet indirectly
addressed conclusion to be made is that Radio Sawa is certainly a politically contentious issue. It is,
after all, an American station, and America itself – as polls have shown – is not a subject on which
many Arabs are hesitant to voice their opinions. There are few people who know about the station, and
know who funds it, who aren't quick to implicate the two in a lengthy discussion of the nature of their
relationship. Radio Sawa, however, speaks of more issues than politics: music, culture, generation, and
technology all find a place in its discourse. If all the political debates surrounding it are put to the side,
Radio Sawa will still be broadcasting in Jordan for the time being, and it will likely still have listeners.
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As long as it's a number on the radio dial playing modern music, even the harshest of politics probably
won't keep hip young Jordanians from tuning in for just a moment, at least until their favorite new song
goes off the air. On this level, maybe Radio Sawa has struck a chord in this country that is much
simpler than all of its connections to international powers and regional politics. Dr. Mahmoud Zawawi,
asked what listeners saw first in Radio Sawa, may have described this phenomenon best of all. “Music
is an international language,” he said. And it's still one Radio Sawa knows how to speak.
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Verification of Informed Consent
School for International Training
Jordan: Modernization and Social Change, Spring 2007
The purpose of this document is to ensure that I have been made aware of the nature of my voluntary
involvement in the study entitled “Radio Sawa in Jordan: Different Perceptions, Together?” conducted
by Michael Turner, including that:
1. I understand that I will be asked to shared my personal views of the United States media
endeavor Radio Sawa and its reception among Jordanian society by means of either an
interview or a short questionnaire.
2. The time required of my participation in this study should amount to roughly an hour or less.
3. The researcher does not foresee any major risks in association with this research, but I am
aware that exposure to discomfort or stress during the course of the study remains a possibility.
If I choose to continue in such a circumstance I do so with understanding of and responsibility
for any personal consequences that may follow. I am free to leave any question unanswered or
to discontinue the study at any time.
4. The information I have provided will be used for research exclusively. I have been presented
the choice to either (___) allow or to (___) disallow the association of my name and affiliation
with the information I provide. If I choose to disallow such, my responses will be utilized
anonymously. Doing so will not affect the structure of the interview or the consideration of the
comments I have made.
5. The researcher will provide additional information about the purpose and nature of the study
and his academic affiliations at my request at any time.

I am aware that I may report dissatisfactions or concerns with any aspect of this experience to Dr.
Muhamed AlKhalil, SIT Jordan Academic Director, at (962) 077 7176318 or sitjordan@gmail.com. I
realize that I must be at least 18 years of age to participate. My signature below is confirmation of my
voluntary participation in this study, understanding of the points above, and reception of a copy of this
consent form.
_________________________
Date

___________________________________
Signature
___________________________________
Print Name
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Statement of Oral Consent
A written informed consent form, as appended to the previous page, was offered to research
participants in the case that they preferred to respond anonymously or simply wished to confirm their
consent in writing for any reason. Some participants chose to utilize this document and signed to verify
their participation, though none indicated a wish to remain anonymous. The majority of participants
waived the form and granted oral consent, which as detailed in the methodology has been deemed
ethically sufficient for a project of this nature.

